Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and
Communication
Volume 4 200 YEARS OF ANALYTICAL
PHILOSOPHY

Article 14

2008

Definitions And Contradictions. Russell, Poincaré, And Lesniewski
François Lepage
Université de Montréal

Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/biyclc

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Lepage, François (2008) "Definitions And Contradictions. Russell, Poincaré, And Lesniewski," Baltic
International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication: Vol. 4. https://doi.org/10.4148/
biyclc.v4i0.138

This Proceeding of the Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication is brought to you for free and open
access by the Conferences at New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Baltic International Yearbook
of Cognition, Logic and Communication by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information,
please contact cads@k-state.edu.

2

Definitions and Contradictions

The Baltic International Yearbook of
Cognition, Logic and Communication
August 2009
pages 1-28

Volume 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.138

François Lepage
Université de Montréal

Definitions and Contradictions
Russell, Poincaré, and Leśniewski

INTRODUCTION

This paper is composed of two independent parts. The ﬁrst is concerned with Russell’s early philosophy of mathematics and his quarrel
with Poincaré about the nature of their opposition. I argue that the
main divergence between the two philosophers was about the nature
of deﬁnitions.
In the second part, I brieﬂy present Leśniewski’s Ontology and
suggest that Leśniewski’s original treatment of deﬁnitions in the foundations of mathematics is the natural solution to the problem that
divided Russell and Poincaré.
1.
1.1.

RUSSELL AND POINCARÉ

Russell

In 1903, Bertrand Russell published a peculiar work, The Principles
of Mathematics, which history will recall as one of the founding texts
of the philosophical movement that would later be called logicism.
The Principles is peculiar for a number of reasons. The most well
known is that it provides the ﬁrst clear presentation and analysis of
the paradox of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves.
Russell encountered this paradox as the text was almost completed.

His presentation and analysis are the subject of the tenth chapter
- which is only ﬁve pages long - and of the second appendix where
Russell presents a sketch of a solution. He seemed not to realize the
scope of this discovery, for the work does not display any sense that
its project is being confronted with a “Foundational Crisis”. On the
contrary, the work optimistically maintains the following thesis: all
mathematics and part of physics are reducible to a few logical principles or, in other words, are logical constructions, which ultimately
rest on primitives amongst which we deﬁne relations.
The discovery of the paradox, however, and its apparent insolvability were potentially catastrophic for Russell’s project: the reduction of mathematics to logic. This reduction meant for Russell,
during this period, that
Pure Mathematics is the class of all propositions of the
form “p implies q” where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except
logical constants.1
Hence, Russell found himself in a delicate position. His work
was supposed to convince the scientiﬁc community that a rigorous
analysis allows us to ground the entirety of mathematics on a very
small number of purely logical principles. But he then shows that this
small number of foundational principles is incoherent. As Poincaré
would later say “Logic is no longer sterile, it fathers antinomy.” 2
Another peculiarity of the work is the scope of the task that
Russell aims to accomplish: the task of reduction or reconstruction,
depending on which view we adopt, is far reaching.
Starting from irrefutable logical principles, the ﬁrst part of the
text is not a reconstruction at all, but a regressive analysis that brings
its author to a logical grammar (the fourth chapter bears the title
Proper names, adjectives and verbs), and to the detailed examination
of the ideas of class, propositional function, variable, relation, and
ﬁnally, contradiction. Russell’s philosophical position in this work
could be called naïve hyperrealism, as his ontology abounds with all
sorts of beings. Everything is or exists, from humans to numbers,
including logical constants. The fundamental concept is that of the
term.
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur
in any true or false proposition, or may be counted as
one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest word in the
philosophical vocabulary. I shall use as synonymous with
it the words unit, individual and entity. The ﬁrst two
emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third
is derived from the fact that every term has being, i.e. is
in some sense. A man, a number, a class, a relation, a
chimaera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure
to be a term; and to deny that such and such a thing is
a term must always be false.3
What is important to take note of here is the introduction of the concept of Being. At this period, Russell defends a realism that could
be fairly characterized as unbridled.4 In the realm of being, as understood by Russell, it is possible to ﬁnd anything one is looking for,
probably even square circles, at least until 1905 with the publication
of “On Denoting”.5 This hyperrealism, which Russell would later repudiate in the second edition of the Principles, plays a very central
role in his early philosophy of mathematics:
At the time when I wrote the “Principles”, I shared with
Frege a belief in the Platonic reality of numbers, which,
in my imagination, peopled the timeless realm of Being.
It was a comforting faith, which I later abandoned with
regret.6
He also wrote in The Principles:
Hence Adam’s ﬁrst thought must have been concerned
with the number 1; for not a single thought could precede this thought. In short, all knowledge must be recognition, on pain of being mere delusion; Arithmetic must
be discovered in just the same sense in which Columbus
discovered the West Indies, and we no more create numbers then he created the Indians.7
Russell’s realism must, therefore, be taken very seriously as it is
a presupposition that grounds the entire work. This philosophy no
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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doubt had an eﬀect, not only on his ontology, but also on his epistemology and, ﬁnally, on the question that concerns us, his conception
of the nature of deﬁnitions.
It should be highlighted that for Russell deﬁnitions cannot be
creative, in the sense that a deﬁnition cannot have the consequence of
bringing a new object into the world of being, consequently enriching
the ontology. For him any deﬁnition is nominal, in a way that will
be speciﬁed.
There are three important passages in the Principles in which the
question of the nature of deﬁnitions is taken up directly. The most
important of these passages is one in which Russell deﬁnes cardinal
numbers and criticizes the deﬁnition from abstraction put forward
by Peano.
The foundational ideas that he relies upon are those of (1) a class
concept, which is a predicate considered from the point of view of its
determining a class; and (2) of a one-one relation between classes,
i.e. a bijective function. Each class concept deﬁnes a class, so according to Russell, “Numbers, then, are to be regarded as properties
of classes”.8 He ﬁrst deﬁnes what it means for two classes to have the
same number.
Two classes have the same number when, and only when,
there is a one-one relation whose domain includes the one
class, and which is such that the class of the terms of the
one class is identical with the other class.(. . . ) When
two classes have the same number, they are said to be
similar.9
This deﬁnition, a variation on Frege’s, is slightly more complex,
the aim being to also take into account empty classes. After noting
that similarity is a reﬂexive, symmetrical and transitive relation, he
introduces the Peanian deﬁnition of number itself:
Now these three properties of a relation are held by Peano
and common sense to indicate that when the relation
holds between two terms, these two terms have a certain
common property, and vice versa. This common property
we call their number. This is the deﬁnition of number by
abstraction.10
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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Thus, for example, all classes having exactly three members have
a common property, that of having three members. This common
property is the number 3. Russell believed that this deﬁnition of
number from abstraction suﬀered from a fatal ﬂaw, that of not ultimately determining the number of a class. In eﬀect, no matter what
common property all similar classes have that is unique to these similar classes, according to the deﬁnition from abstraction this is the
number of this class. Consider, for example, the following relation:
All classes having three members and only them are also related to
the computer I am using now. This relation surely has being just
as any other relation and it satisﬁes the deﬁnition of the number 3
by abstraction. But then, any object whatever can be the number
3. The deﬁnition from abstraction determines a class of terms that
all have the common attribute of being related to similar classes, as
being related to these classes andno others. There are two possible
ways of remedying this problem. The ﬁrst consists in considering
the number of a class to be a class of all the entities that have this
property of being related to all the classes that are similar and only
those.
But this method is practically useless, since all entities,
without exception, belong to every such class, so that
every class will have as its number the class of all entities
of every sort and description.11
The solution that Russell puts forward is one that he believes can
be applied universally anywhere that the deﬁnition from abstraction
is applicable, it is as follows:
This method is, to deﬁne as the number of a class the
class of all classes similar to the given class. Membership of this class of classes (considered as a predicate) is
a common property of all the similar classes and of no
others; moreover every class of the set of similar classes
has to the set a relation which it has to nothing else, and
which every class has to its own set.12
This, according to Russell, solves the problem. Russell himself was
shocked to learn that Peano had thought of adopting this deﬁnition
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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and ﬁnally decided to reject it. It seems that for Peano, intuitively
speaking, the class of similar classes to any given class has properties
that the number that we are seeking to deﬁne does not have, although
Russell admits that he does not know which ones. Russell insists that
the number is itself a class of classes and not a class concept which
determines this class of classes. This is because one class of classes
corresponds to more than one class concept. For example, the class
of classes similar to the class of the stars in our solar system is the
same as the class of classes similar to the class of the heads of the
Roman Catholic Church at a given time (since the Sun is the only
star in our solar system and there is only one Pope at any time in
history), but their class concepts are totally diﬀerent.
This stance on the nature of numbers is fundamental for Russell’s
philosophy of mathematics. At the very end of the work (apart from
the appendices), actually in the conclusion, Russell sums up the entirety of the work and makes the following statement, which is worth
repeating:
A deﬁnition is always either the deﬁnition of a class, or
the deﬁnition of the single member of a unit class: this
is a necessary result of the plain fact that a deﬁnition
can only be eﬀected by assigning a property of the object
or objects to be deﬁned, i.e. by stating a propositional
function which they are to satisfy. [. . . ] And wherever the
principle of abstraction is employed, i.e. where the object
to be deﬁned is obtained from a transitive symmetrical
relation, some class of classes will always be the object
required.13
For Russell this idea of deﬁnition corrects a fundamental problem with the deﬁnition by abstraction, which remains deﬁnitively
ambiguous. We can conclude that, at the time of the Principles,
deﬁnitions are not, for Russell, creative in the sense that a deﬁnition
does not generate a new term. The reason rests on Russell’s realism.
For Peano from the class of all similar classes we can abstract a new
object, the number of members of these similar classes. But for Russell, given any object, there is a relation (not we can deﬁne a relation,
it is already there) such that all and any of the similar classes have
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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the relation to that object and to no other. Terms for Russell are
eternal and immutable. Must we therefore conclude that deﬁnitions
are sterile? Russell recognizes the problem that this could engender.
Insofar as his ultimate goal is to show how all of mathematics can
be reconstructed out of a small number of logical primitives by use
of ever more complex deﬁnitions, he cannot accept that deﬁnitions
are sterile, or if they are it is in a trivial way: a deﬁnition is not a
construction, it is an identiﬁcation. Curiously, Russell takes up this
question at the beginning of the work, in the chapter entitled Denoting (which has nothing to do with the concept of denotation which
appears in “On Denoting”).14
It is a curious paradox, puzzling to the symbolic mind,
that deﬁnitions, theoretically, are nothing but statements
of symbolic abbreviations, irrelevant to the reasoning and
inserted only for practical convenience, while yet, in the
development of a subject, they always require a very large
amount of thought, and often embody some of the greatest achievements of analysis. This fact seems to be explained by the theory of denoting. An object may be
present to the mind, without our knowing any concept of
which the said object is the instance; and the discovery
of such a concept is not a mere improvement in notation.
The reason why this appears to be the case is that, as
soon as the deﬁnition is found, it becomes wholly unnecessary to the reasoning to remember the actual object
deﬁned, since only concepts are relevant to our deductions. In the moment of discovery, the deﬁnition is seen
to be true, because the object to be deﬁned was already in
our thoughts; but as part of our reasoning it is not true,
but merely symbolic, since what the reasoning requires is
not that it should deal with that object, but merely that
it should deal with the object denoted by the deﬁnition.15
It is unlikely that Russell’s theory is entirely coherent. However, it
successfully accomplishes the task of reduction and implies a minimal
epistemology, that of recognition of what is already there. Later, the
famous contradiction will complicate matters, but for the time being
Russell, strangely, did not recognize this.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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1.2.

Poincaré (and Russell)

Two years later, while he was still contemplating the famous contradiction, Russell published a review of the English translation of
Poincaré’s work La science et l’hypothèse in Mind. This review unleashed a controversy in which, though not explicitly the center of
attention, the question of the status of deﬁnitions and of whether
they are sterile or useful, would be extensively debated. It is necessary to say that the tone adopted at once by Russell is that of
somebody who looks for quarrel. This is obvious from the beginning
of the ﬁrst paragraph.
In this book, which consists in the main of previous articles somewhat re-written, M. Poincaré’s well-known merits appear to the full – his lucid and trenchant brevity, his
air of easy mastery, which often makes his thought appear
less profound than it is, and his power of co-ordinating
the whole domain of mathematics and physics in a single system of ideas. But these merits, great as they are,
are accompanied by what cannot but appear as defects
to any one accustomed to philosophy.16
The tone that is adopted announces from the beginning that the
ensuing debate will be fruitless. Even though Russell and Poincaré
use the same vocabulary they are not really talking about the same
thing.
The ﬁrst edition of La science et l’hypothèse dates from 1902
and the English translation from 1905. The ﬁrst chapter is entitled
“Sur la nature du raisonnement mathématique”. Poincaré defends the
following thesis: logic, because of the tautological nature of syllogistic
reasoning, is sterile.
Nothing essentially new can be learned from syllogism
and, if everything results from the principle of identity,
everything should be able to come down to it. Will one
admit that all these theorems that ﬁll so many volumes
be only diverted manners to say that A is A?17
One thing that should be pointed out is that when Poincaré talks
about logic he is talking about Aristotelian logic as it had been
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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handed down to us and transformed throughout history. He is not
talking about the new logic, or as it was called at the time “logistic”, which started with Boole, and that Frege and Russell would
eventually render important through their propositional calculus. In
fact, he seems to make no distinction between ancient and modern
logicians.
A second thesis that Poincaré puts forward is that mathematical
science, in opposition to logic, is creative, and that its creative power
lies essentially in inductive proof (Poincaré uses the now outmoded
expression “raisonnement par récurrence”).
The essential character of mathematical induction is that
it contains, condensed so to speak in a unique formula,
an inﬁnity of syllogisms. (. . . ) We thus see that, in the
reasoning by induction, we just express the minor premise
of the ﬁrst syllogism, and the general formula which contains as particular cases all the major premises.18
The validity of inductive reasoning cannot be proved. It comes
from the power of the mind which is capable of conceiving an indefinite repetition of similar acts.
This rule, inaccessible by analytical demonstration and by
experiment, is the genuine type of the a priori synthetic
judgment. On the other hand, we could not think of it as
a convention as for some of the postulates of geometry.19
Despite their exchanges, Russell and Poincaré will never arrive
at a point of agreement, for the gulf that separates their ways of
thinking is too great. On Poincaré’s side, induction is based on the
irreducible synthetic a priori intuition that some act of the mind
can be repeated indeﬁnitely and this is equivalent to an inﬁnity of
syllogisms. For Russell, there is no problem here, because there is no
problem with endless processes.
The property of the mind which is in question is, therefore, this “It is possible to add 1 to any number whatever”.
But this does not yield us the principle of mathematical
induction. Which says not merely that the addition of 1
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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will always give a number, but that every natural number can be obtained from such addition starting from 0.
It limits the natural number at the same time that it
shows the series of them to be endless: they all appear in
this series, any point of which can be reached by successive steps starting from 0. Now this limitation, which is
what is really used when proofs are conducted by mean of
mathematical induction, is not a synthetic a priori intuition, or a property of the mind, or a condensation of an
inﬁnite number of syllogisms, it is merely the definition
of a ﬁnite number.20
The question of the nature of deﬁnitions would however gravitate towards slightly diﬀerent contexts; that of the unpredictability of certain deﬁnitions, those of properties that do not determine classes. In
fact, in 1905, Russell presented an article in which he proposed three
possible solutions for eliminating these paradoxes.21 In this article
Russell presented sketches of three promising theories for avoiding
contradiction. These are (a) the zigzag theory, (b) the theory of limitation of size and (c) the no class theory. One interesting thing that
Russell presents is a matrix, which he thinks applies to all cases of
contradiction based on unpredictability.
Given a property φ and a function f , such that, if φ
belongs to all the members of u, f ‘u always exists, has
the property φ, and is not a member of u; then the supposition that there is a class w of all terms having the
property φ and that f ‘w exists leads to the conclusion
that f ‘w both has and has not the property φ.22
Here is a classical example using contemporary notation. Let the
barber in some town be the man who shaves all and only those men
that do not shave themselves. Let φ(x) stand for x shaves x. If u
is such that if (∀x)(x ∈ u ⊃ φ(x)) then φ(u) exist (it is the barber),
φ(f (u)) (the barber shaves itself) and f (u) ∈
/ u (the barber is not
among the selected class u). Up to this point, there is no contradiction because the barber may come from another town. Now suppose
that we restrict ourselves to all the men of a given town. In that
case w = {x : φ(x)} and f (w) exists (there is a man in town who is
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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a barber i.e. a man who shaves all men and only those men that do
not shave themselves). This leads to a contradiction: Suppose that
φ(f (w)). Then f (w) ∈
/ w and because w = {x : φ(x)}, ¬φ(f (w)).
But (∀x)(x ∈ w ⊃ φ(x)), thus f (w) exists and φ(f (w)). In such a
case the solution is quite simple: there is no barber as deﬁned above.
The situation is more complex if we start with x is a member of x
instead of x shaves x. But nevertheless, some sets are like the barber,
they do not exist.
The task for Russell is to ﬁnd a natural and intuitive way of
blocking the formation of these kinds of monsters. This is what the
three approaches should be able to do. The zigzag theory consists in
axiomitazing the idea of a predicative function. This approach was
abandoned rapidly as it lacks directing principles, apart from the one
that avoids contradiction.23 The second theory uses also the idea of
predictability but it is no longer the complexity of the property that
will be the source of its unpredictability, but rather the size of the
class to be deﬁned. This approach was suggested to Russell by the
Burali-Forti paradox. Here again he will not make much progress.
Only the third approach will be retained by Russell. At the moment
of publication he would add the following note:
[Note added 5th February 1906. From further investigation I now feel hardly any doubt that the no-classes theory
aﬀords the complete solution of all the diﬃculties stated
in the ﬁrst section of this paper.]24
In this embryonic theory, which would later become the type theory,
Russell no longer considers propositional functions as primitive and
chooses instead the idea of a proposition, leaving propositional functions to be reconstructed. Let p be a proposition and a one of its
constituents. ‘p(x/a)’ denotes what p would become if each occurrence of a were substituted for x at each occurrence within p. We can
use this notation to maintain more general quantiﬁed statements like
‘p(x/a) is true for every value of x’. This reconstructed propositional
function is independent of a in the following manner. Let q = p(b/a).
It is therefore equivalent to state ‘p(x/a) is true for every value of x’
and ‘q(x/b) is true for every value of x’. It is obvious that ‘p(x/a)’
and ‘p(x/b)’ have the same structure. However, the more interesting
consequence of this ﬁnding is as follows:
www.thebalticyearbook.org

12

Definitions and Contradictions

Here the values of x for which p(x/a) is true replace the
class u; but we do not assume that these values collectively form a single entity which is the class composed of
them.25
We are far from the ontology of the Principles. Russell’s philosophy of deﬁnitions seems to have taken a radical turn. Do not forget
that this article was written two or three months after the publication of “On Denoting”. We may ﬁrst notice a sort of “linguistic turn”.
Deﬁnitions of the sort p(x/a) are no longer mere truisms. The syntax
of language and even grammar take a dominant role. Contradictions
can be avoided because we no longer postulate that an object u,
which would be the class of values that makes p(x/a) true, preexists
in some realm of Being. There are combinations of symbols which
seem to make sense but fail to denote anything. Deﬁnitions take on
a new status, even if this status is not made explicit.
Poincaré vehemently attacks Russell’s theories in an article published in La Revue de métaphysique et de morale entitled “Les mathématiques et la logique”. It should be noted that Russell is a bit
inconsistent: maintaining three theories in one text, with each of
the theories being inconsistent with the next, is an exploit that few
philosophers have been able to accomplish.
What is most interesting about Poincaré’s article is not its attack
of Russell’s proposals but his solution to the problem of paradoxes.
A deﬁnition should not contain vicious circles, meaning that the
deﬁnition of a set of objects E should not make reference to the
set E as though it predated its deﬁnition. This implies, as we have
already seen, that for Poincaré deﬁnitions are not trivial, they create
objects, on the condition that we respect certain principles such as
the non-circularity principle.
Poincaré goes even further. For him even the deﬁnition of the
inductive number, i.e. of natural numbers by induction is not predicative.26 For him, the only way to avoid contradictions is to respect
the principle of non-circularity in formulating deﬁnitions.
It is interesting to examine Russell’s response in “Les paradoxes
de la logique”.
M. Poincaré holds that theses paradoxes all spring from
some kind of vicious circle, and in this I agree with him.
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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But he fails to realize the diﬃculty of avoiding a vicious
circle of this sort. I shall try to show that, if it is to be
avoided, something like my ‘no-class’ theory seems necessary; indeed, it was for this purpose that I invented the
theory.27

variables which will yield the vicious-circle principle as an
outcome. It is for this reason that we need a reconstruction of logical ﬁrst principles, and cannot rest satisﬁed
with the mere fact that the paradoxes are due to vicious
circles.29

Thus, Poincaré failed to notice the diﬃculty involved in avoiding the
vicious circle simply by prohibiting the use of circular deﬁnitions.
According to Russell, this diﬃculty is as follows:

Russell scores a serious point in this game against Poincaré. It is
Poincaré’s doctrine of the universe of discourse that he attacks. There
is no single universe of discourse. Even a statement like “for every x,
x = x” cannot be understood as quantifying over all objects without
restriction. The vicious circle principle, as it is proposed by Poincaré,
itself violates this principle (the deﬁnition of E refers to E). Russell’s proposition is a profound reformation of the procedures that we
consider legitimate for introducing new definitions of objects.
Note the extent of the distance traveled since the Principles. The
richness of Russell’s ontology in 1903 allowed him to advance to a
less trivial theory of deﬁnitions. The discovery of the contradictions
pushed him towards a serious examination of the structure of language. This led in return to the discovery of his theory of descriptions, which would permanently destroy his naiveté. However, along
with the discovery his entire ontology would have to be modiﬁed.

The vicious circle he [Poincaré] proposes to avoid by deﬁning E as ‘all numbers deﬁnable in a ﬁnite number of words
without mentioning E.’ to the noninitiated, this deﬁnition looks more circular than ever.28
The problem for Russell is that he must characterize the constraints
that must be imposed on propositional functions in order that they
give rise to classes in an independent way. It is not suﬃcient to say
that the vicious circle must be avoided. The fundamental logical
principles, once respected, must ensure that we are not dragged into
the vicious circle. But this should be a consequence of the soundness
of the logical principles, not a principle in itself. Russell’s fundamental idea is that each proposition related to a class can be paraphrased by a proposition related to the value of variables that satisfy
a propositional function. What he used to consider the definition of
a class he now views as deﬁning the range of a propositional function,
but the latter is not an object suitable to be taken as a value for the
propositional function. In fact, Russell would later arrive at a certain
reiﬁcation of classes, but these cannot be values of the propositional
function that engendered the classes, only propositional functions of
a superior type. This will be the Type Theory. For the moment,
what is important is that a reform of syntax is necessary in order for
the possibility of contradiction to disappear.
It is important to observe that the vicious-circle principle is not in itself the solution of vicious-circle paradoxes,
but merely the result which a theory must yield if it is to
aﬀord a solution of them. It is necessary, that is to say,
to construct a theory of expressions containing apparent
www.thebalticyearbook.org

The vicious circles arise when a phrase containing such
words as all or some (i.e. containing an apparent variable) appears itself to stand for one of the objects to
which the words all or some are applied. This appearance must, therefore, be deceptive. The diﬃculty is that
there is reason to hold that all must be capable of meaning absolutely all ; thus the phrases in question must not
stand for entities at all.30
Poincaré would not really respond to this text of Russell’s. In 1909
he published his ﬁnal text on the subject of unpredictability in the
journal Revue de métaphysique et de morale: “La logique de l’inﬁni”.
He meticulously reworked his vicious circle theory by applying it
to classiﬁcations. We cannot classify objects that do not yet exist.
However “any deﬁnition is a classiﬁcation”.31 He does not resume the
discussion with Russell but instead simply repeats his earlier claims.
He puts an end to any future discussion by repeating his profession
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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of faith regarding the role of intuition.
Mr Russell will doubtless say to me that it is not about
psychology, but about logic and epistemology; and I shall
be led to answer that there is no logic and epistemology independent from psychology; and this declaration
of principles will probably close the discussion because it
will bring to light an irreparable diﬀerence of view.32
2.

It seems to us that the weakness of these attempts lies in
the fact that they are generally limited to modiﬁcations
of foundations which outlaw the formulation of the known
paradoxes within the system. But such a procedure is no
protection against unanticipated paradoxes which might
appear in the system.33
In other words, Russell and Zermelo provided not only ad hoc solutions but also solutions directed only against the known contradiction without any idea of what would happen if another kind of
contradiction were to appear somewhere else in the foundations of
mathematics.
Leśniewski, and following him, Sobociński, rejected set theory,
more precisely, rejected set theory as based on the use of “∈” in

www.thebalticyearbook.org

favour of a new theory, called “Ontology”, based on a new connective
“ε” which diﬀers from the former in a number of ways.
We will see that the meaning of “ε” is not “user friendly” and
that the temptation to go back to naïve set theory in metalinguistic
contexts is irrepressible.
This system, which diﬀers in many ways from contemporary systems, is non contradictory (which is easy to
prove), and is an adequate base for the contemporary
mathematics. However, it is not very easy to get the system, nor is it easy to penetrate the psychology from which
it arose – what precisely were Leśniewski’s thoughts about
Russell’s paradox.34

LEŚNIEWSKI

Leśniewski probably never heard about the arguments between Russell and Poincaré. However, the most interesting logical/philosophical
solution to the contradiction appears in his work. In his paper
“Leśniewski’s Analysis of Russell’s Paradox”, Boleslaw Sobociński
presents the way Leśniewski’s systems provide a solution to the contradictions in set theory. Leśniewski’s systems were, in fact, introduced to avoid contradictions in the foundation of mathematics in
what Leśniewski called a natural way. It is diﬃcult to know exactly
what it is to be a natural way to avoid contradictions. However, we
know what it is, for him, to be a non-natural way to avoid contradiction because we have two examples: Russell’s way and Zermelo’s
way. Here is a quotation about Russell and Zermelo from Sobociński.
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Curiously, there is no suggestion of a deﬁnition of “a ∈ b” inside
Ontology, a deﬁnition that would save the smart naïve properties of
“∈” but leave the system free of contradiction. In what follows, I
will ﬁrst give a rough sketch of Ontology and describe the essential
features of protothetics, which is the logical system in which Ontology
is expressed. I will then present Sobociński’s solution of the paradox
(which is presented as a formalization of Leśniewski’s solution).
Next, I will introduce some deﬁnitions of simple operators and I
will then provide a deﬁnition of “a ∈ b”. Finally, I will discuss some
properties of this “∈” which are in fact common properties of the
various “∈”.
2.1.

Ontology

Leśniewski’s solution to the problem of the paradoxes is not a solution
within some version of set theory. Leśniewski provides a system, a
calculus of names, which is consistent and in which any attempt to
construct statements that violate the vicious circle principle turn out
to be false. This calculus of names is what he called “Ontology”. As
I said above, Ontology is expressed in a very basic logical language,
the system of Protothetics. Protothetics is a kind of higher order
propositional logic with denumerably many variables of any category
and only two primitives: the universal quantiﬁer and identity.
Protothetics is a generalized calculus of propositions containing
variables of arbitrary syntactic categories deﬁnable starting with the
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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basic category S of sentences.
Deﬁnition 1.1

(i)

S is a syntactic category

(ii)

If X, X 1 , . . . , X n are syntactic categories, X/X 1 . . . X n is a
syntactic category.

(iii)

Nothing else is a syntactic category.

The wﬀ’s of Protothetics are35
(i)

A variable of type S;

(ii)

Identity statements pA ≡ Bq where A and B are wﬀ’s;

(iii)

Generalization: xv 1 . . . v n ypAq where A is a wﬀ;

(iv) All the expressions N (v 1 . . . v n ) where N is introduced by a
deﬁnition. The general form of these deﬁnitions is
xv 1 . . . v n ypN (v 1 . . . v n ) ≡ A(v 1 . . . v n )q
where N is a new constant and N (v 1 . . . v n ) is of category S and
A(v 1 . . . v n ) is an already deﬁned wﬀ and xv 1 . . . v n y is universal
quantiﬁcation over v 1 . . . v n .
This particularity of the system keeps it free from contradiction.
The rules used to introduce new terms cannot produce contradictions
and this is quite independent of the other features of Leśniewski’s
system.
The problem of deﬁnition in the theory of deduction lies
quite outside my system of foundations of mathematics.
What interested me in this problem, if I may so express
myself, was its own constructive appeal – in view of the
still rather stepmotherly treatment of it even in the current scientiﬁc trend in theory of deduction and theory of
theory of deduction.36
Leśniewski provided a set of rules for the introduction of new constants that protects any theory using it from any contradiction.
Here are some examples of deﬁnitions in Protothetics:
p where p is a propositional variable
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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xpyppq(which can be used as falsity ⊥)
xpyp(p ≡ p)q (which can be used as truth T )
xpyp(¬(p) ≡ (p ≡ xqypqq))q (this wﬀ introduces negation)
xpqyp(∧pq) ≡ xf yp(p ≡ (xryp(p ≡ f (r))q ≡ xryp(q ≡ f (r))q)q)q
(this wﬀ introduces conjunction).37
In the last example, f is of category S/S.
xpqyp((p ∨ q) ≡ ¬(¬p ∧ q))q
xpqyp((p ⊃ q) ≡ (¬p ∨ q))q
There are many equivalent ways to axiomatize Protothetics. Here is
a system taken from Słupecki 1950:
A1. xpqrypppp ≡ qq ≡ ppr ≡ qq ≡ pp ≡ rqqqq
A2. xpqypppp ≡ qq ≡ xf ypf (p) ≡ f (q)qqq
A3. xpqyppp ≡ qq ≡ pxf yppf (p) ≡ f (q)q ≡ pp ≡ qqqqq
A4. xf yp(f (xpyppq) ≡ ((f (xpyppq) ≡ xpyppq) ≡ (xqypf (xpyppq) ≡
f (q)q)))q.
If we add the following 5 rules
R1. Substitution
R2. Detachment
R3. Distribution of quantiﬁers
R4. Extensionality (of any expression of any category)
R5. Rule of deﬁnition (every deﬁnition as above is a theorem)
We have a complete system in the following sense: every closed wﬀ
of category S is either a theorem or its negation is a theorem. In
particular, all the valid inferences in classical logic are valid in prothotetics.
It is worth saying a few words about the distinction between Protothetics and the theory of propositional types. Firstly, Protothetics
is purely nominalistic: there is no formal semantics in terms of a
hierarchy of functions built on truth values. For sure, we have an
implicit semantics: the theorems are taken as the true statements,
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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expressions of the type S/S can be seen as denoting one place propositional functions, etc. But these considerations play no role in the
theory. Protothetics is a syntactic theory and thus nominalistic. This
brings me to a second remark. A system of Protothetics is never completely developed. One can always introduce a new constant and thus
new theorems. Each system is complete but this completeness is relative to the constant functors already introduced, so each system is
a work in progress. This is the major diﬀerence from propositional
type theory where the hierarchy of propositional functions is given
once and for all.
Ontology is an extension of Protothetics obtained by adding a
second basic category, the category N of names.
Deﬁnition 1.2

(i)

S and N are syntactic categories;

(ii)

If X, X 1 , . . . , X n are syntactic categories, X/X 1 . . . X n is a
syntactic category.

(iii)

Nothing else is a syntactic category.

Ontology contains a new constant “ε” of category S/N N . AεB should
be read A is a part of B. “ε” should not be confused with the “∈” of
set theory. For example, “ε” is transitive whereas “∈” is not. Equality
between expressions of category N is introduced in the following way:
xabcyp(a = b) ≡ p(cεa) ≡ (cεb)qq
A system for Ontology is obtained by adding
A5. xabyp(aεb) ≡ ((¬(xcy¬(cεa))∧xdcy(((dεa)∧(cεa)) ⊃ (dεc))∧
xdy((dεa) ⊃ (dεb)))q
We can prove that the truth conditions of aεb are:
aεb is true iﬀ a is a name of an individual (a denotes one and
only one thing) and a is among the b.
So a name can denote an individual as well as a multiplicity. If B
denotes a multiplicity x and y and . . . and z we will say that b is
x, y, . . . , z. This is a metanotation: xεb, yεb, etc. have some meaning
but not xεx, y, . . . , z. Examples:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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“Socrates is a man” is true.
“Socrates is Socrates” is true.
“Animals are animals” is false (literally, but “All animals are
animals” is true). In fact, if A stands for the animals, AεA is
false but xxyp(xεA ⊃ xεA)q is true.
“Hamlet is the hero of a tragedy by Shakespeare” is false
(because Hamlet does not exist).
A5 states that aεb is the conjunction of three properties:
(1) x∃yy(yεa)
(2) xyzy((yεx ∧ zεx) ⊃ yεz)
(3) xyy(yεx ⊃ yεb)
From (2) and the deﬁnition of identity xabcyp(a = b) ≡ p(cεa) ≡
(cεb)qq, we easily show that aεb means that (i) something is (an)
a, (ii) any two things which are a are identical and (iii) every thing
which is an a is also a b.38
2.2.

The contradiction in Leśniewski’s Ontology

In order to show how Russell’s paradox cannot arise in Ontology,
Sobociński introduced the distinction between a class as one (collective class) and a class as many (distributive class). Let a be an
object. Kl(a) is an object called the collective class of a. Conversely,
if B is a collective class, then el(B) is an object called the distributive
class of B. The two notions are related by the following equivalence:
xaby(bεel(a) ≡ x∃cy(aεKl(c) ∧ bεc))
Let us illustrate it by the following example. Let S stand for Socrates
and H stands for humanity. Both are names of individuals. Let us
instantiate the above equivalence by letting a be H and b be S. We
have
(Sεel(H) ≡ x∃cy(HεKl(c) ∧ Sεc))
There is certainly such a c, the multiplicity of men. In other words,
Socrates is one of the elements of the collective class of men iﬀ there
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is a distributive class c such that humanity is the collective class of
c and Socrates is one of the c.
A limiting case is when the distributive class is an individual.
In that case the collective class and the distributive class collapse
into the same object, the individual. For example, let us consider
Socrates:
(Sεel(S) ≡ x∃cy(SεKl(c) ∧ SεS))
taking S as c this is equivalent to
(SεS ≡ (SεS ∧ SεS)).
The following properties of el and Kl can be established.39
K1 xay(x∃by(bεa) ≡ x∃cy(cεKl(a)))
There are some a iﬀ there is a collective class of the a’s.
K2 xabcy((aεKl(c) ∧ bεKl(c)) ⊃ a = b)
If two objects are the collective class of the c, they are the same
object.

K9 xabypaεKl(el(Kl(b))) ≡ aεKl(b)q
K10 xay(aεa ⊃ aεel(a))
If a is an individual, a is one of the distributive class of the a’s or
each individual is an element of itself.
K11 xabcy((aεel(b) ∧ bεel(c)) ⊃ aεel(c))
K12 xaby(aεel(b) ⊃ bεb))
K13 xaby((aεel(b) ∧ bεel(a)) ⊃ a = b)
K14 xabypaεKl(b) ≡ (aεa ∧ x∃cycεb ∧ (xcycεb ⊃ cεel(a))) ∧
(xcy(cεel(a) ⊃ x∃dey(dεb ∧ eεel(d) ∧ eεel(c)))q
Sobociński showed that the two axioms used by Russell40 and others
A1

xayx∃by(bεKl(a))

A2

xabcdy((aεKl(c) ∧ aεKl(d) ∧ bεd) ⊃ bεc)

The distinctions made by Leśniewski, enable him to realize that the illusory intuitiveness of A2 [. . . ] is the consequence of the confusion caused by the use of the same
noun for the two diﬀerent concepts [distributive class and
collective class].42

Any individual is the collective class of this individual.
K4 xaby((aεKl(b) ∧ bεb) ⊃ a = b)

K5 xaby(aεKl(b) ≡ (a = Kl(b)))
If a is one of the objects “collective class” of the b’s then a is the
collective class of the b’s.
K6 xaby(aεKl(b) ≡ (aεKl(Kl(b))))
K7 xabcy((aεKl(b) ∧ aεKl(c)) ⊃ (Kl(b) = Kl(c)))
K8 xabyp(aεel(b) ≡ (x∃cy(bεKl(c) ∧ aεc))q
a is one of the objects of the distributive class el(b) iﬀ b is the collective class of some c and a is a c.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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are false (their negations can be proved) and there is no more contradiction. . .

K3 xay(aεa ⊃ a = Kl(a))

If an individual a is the collective class of the b’s and b is an individual,
then a is b.
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The question now is: is it possible to deﬁne ‘∈’, i.e. to deﬁne a
relation that possesses most of the properties of the naïve ∈ but free
of contradiction?
2.3.

Set theory

We will need some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition of the empty name Λ:
D1

xxypxεΛ ≡ (xεx ∧ ¬(xεx))q

43

A consequence of this deﬁnition is that xεΛ is always false of x. Λ
does not denote, it fails to denote.
Deﬁnition (there is at least one x)
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D2

new in the sense that {a} =
6 b for every primitive b. Because,
{a}ε{a}, {a} is an individual.
If a is a russellian set of type n, then {a} is a RSS of type
n + 1.
It is clear that no term of type n is identical to a term of type
n + 1.

xxypEx(x) ≡ [∃y](yεx)q

Deﬁnition (there is at most one x)
D3

xxypM o(x) ≡ xyzy((yεx ∧ zεx) ⊃ yεz)q

Deﬁnition (ontological inclusion)44
D4

xxyypx ⊆ ∗ y ≡ xzy(zεx ⊃ zεy)q)

(ii)

Here is a sentence equivalent to the axiom of Ontology.

est type of the ai ’s. If there is no greatest type in the sequence, ∪ai is not deﬁned.

Some corollaries

i

Remark ∪ai is of the form {z} were y i εz for all and only the

C1 xxy(¬(xεΛ)) and xxy(¬(Λεx))
xxyzy((xεy ∧ yεz) ⊃ xεz)
T3 Reﬂexivity of ⊆ ∗
xxyy(xεy ⊃ xεy) and thus xyy(y ⊆ ∗ y)
Some properties of “ε” are properties of “∈” but some are not. So
the question is: can we deﬁne some “∈” in Ontology?45 Beforehand
we have to decide the status of russellian sets in Ontology. Are they
individuals, i.e., can a sentence like xεy be possibly true, or are they
multiplicities? Our naïve conception of sets says that they are both:
sets have members and can be members, and from some point of
view, this is the origin of the contradiction. However, we know that
Ontology is consistent and that following the rules for the deﬁnitions
cannot generate a contradiction. The following deﬁnition seems to
be adequate.
2.4.

Inductive deﬁnition of Russellian Classes (RC)

Let us call a name primitive if it belongs to pure Ontology.
We deﬁne the hierarchy of Russellian Simple Sets (RSS).
(i)

For name a, the function {} introduce a new name noted {a}
called singleton a. If a is primitive (a is not already an image
of {}, {a} is a RSS of type 1. {a} is such that {a}ε{a}. {a} is

www.thebalticyearbook.org

Let a0 , . . . , ai , . . . be a sequence of RSS such that ai = {y i }
for each i.
∪ai = {y 0 , . . . , y j , . . .} is a RC of the same type as the greati

T1 xxyypxεy ≡ (E(x) ∧ M o(x) ∧ x ⊆ ∗ y)q

T2 Transitivity of ε
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i

y j of the sequence y 0 , . . . , y j , . . ..
(iii)

Let x0 , . . . , xi , . . . be a sequence of RC such that xi = {z i }
for each i.
∪xi = {z 0 , . . . , z j , . . .} is a RC of the same type as the greati

est type of the xi ’s. If there is no greatest type in the sequence, ∪xi is not deﬁned.
i

The last restriction is necessary to block the deﬁnition of a
teratological object like {{{. . . {{{a}}} . . .}}} which has no
type. In general, a sequence of unbound sets does not give a
set by applying (ii) or (iii).
Example:
Suppose we start with a, b and c.
Using (i) we can deﬁne {a}, {b}, {c}, {{a}}, {{b}}, {{c}}, etc.
Using (ii), we can, for example, deﬁne {d} where d is the
multiplicity a, b, {c}. If a, b, c are of type 0, {d} is of type 2.
Using (iii), we can, for example, deﬁne {e} where e is the
multiplicity a, b, {{a}, {b, c}}, {{{a}}}. {e} is of type 4.
However, the sequence {a}, {{a}}, {{{a}}}, . . . of sets does
not give a set by applying (iii).
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We see that we can deﬁne individuals that look like classical sets.
But do they have properties of classical sets?
Definition of “∈”
xxyypx ∈ {y} ≡ (xεy)q
Definition of ∅
∅ = {Λ}
Proposition
xxy(¬(x ∈ ∅))
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theory is possible only because we have a clear notion of what is a
sound deﬁnition, the notion which was at the heart of the PoincaréRussell quarrel. Moreover, it seems possible to deﬁne a rather naïve
set theory which is free of contradiction (as any other constructions
in Ontology) by deﬁnition in Ontology. This suggests that the very
problem about the contradiction was really a problem about how to
understand and restrict deﬁnitions as Poincaré thought.
However, a lot of questions remain unanswered about reintroducing set theory in Ontology. One of them is the following: is it possible
to deﬁne a formal semantics that is in harmony with the spirit of Ontology? And which are the axioms for this set theory? This will be
the object of another paper.

Proposition

Notes

xxy(¬(x ∈ x))
One of the necessary conditions for x ∈ y to be true is that the type
of y is strictly greater than the type of x, so x ∈ x can never be true.
Extensionality can be easily proved. Here is a sketch:
pz ∈ x ≡ z ∈ yq is equivalent to pz ∈ {a} ≡ z ∈ {b}q
which is equivalent to pzεa ≡ zεbq which is equivalent to
a = b.
Foundation is also easy to prove. Here is a sketch:
Suppose that x is not empty. We have to prove that
∃y(y ∈ x ∧ ¬∃z(z ∈ y ∧ z ∈ x))
As x is not empty, we take as y one that has the lowest type. If there
is a z such that z ∈ y, z has a lower type than y which contradicts
that z ∈ x because y is of the lowest type in x.
Union axiom and power set axiom are also sound deﬁnitions of
new sets when applied to existent sets.
3.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

Russell’s contradiction can be naturally eliminated in a theory like
Ontology, which does not use the notion of class. Curiously, such a
www.thebalticyearbook.org

1

The Principles, p. 3.
« Les Mathématiques et la logique » p.316.
3 The Principles, p. 43. Note that the Principles and Russell’s other texts
from this period contain within them a double ambiguity or systematic confusion,
which sometimes makes them diﬃcult to interpret. Russell uses the semantic
tool of expressions in order to designate what expressions refer to. The use of
the expression “term” is a particularly ﬂagrant case and the passage cited above
is particularly troublesome. The terms are entities that are used to compose
propositions, which are themselves sometimes statements and sometimes that to
which the statements refer.
4 Russell had probably already started his lectures on Meinong from which
he would publish a number of important papers between 1899 and 1907. Three
of these papers appeared in Essays in Analysis. See also Douglas Lackey’s introduction to the volume “Russell’s Critique of Meinong”.
5 Printed in the Essays
6 The Principles, p. X.
7 The Principles, p. 451.
8 The Principles, p. 113 .Russell deals with this subject in the ﬁrst chapter of
the second part of the Principles entitled Numbers. Russell makes no reference to
the contradiction that brings him to his principle of unrestricted extensionality,
which was, curiously, the subject of the preceding chapter.
9 The Principles, p. 113.
10 The Principles, p. 114.
11 The Principles, p. 115.
12 The Principles, p. 115.
13 The Principles, p. 497.
14 This has nothing to do with the fact that Russell admits in the introduction
to the second edition that his theory of descriptions is one of two discoveries that
led him to reject the Platonism of the Prinicples. The second is the rejection of
2
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classes! See The Principles, p. X.
15 The Principles, p. 63.
16 Review of Science and Hypothesis, p. 412
17 La science et l’hypothèse p. 31.
18 La science et l’hypothèse p. 39.
19 La science et l’hypothèse p. 41.
20 La science et l’hypothèse p. 41.
21 “On Some Diﬃculties in the Theory of Transﬁnite Numbers and Order
Types”, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, 4, 1906, pp.
29-53. Reprint in Essays in Analysis, pp. 135-164. The references refer to this
latest edition
22 Essays in Analysis, p. 142.
23 SeeEssays in Analysis, p. 147.
24 Essays in Analysis, p. 164.
25 Essays in Analysis, p. 155.
26 « Les mathématiques. . . » p. 309.
27 « Les paradoxes. . . », p. 627. The original manuscript is reprint in the
Essays. . . pp. 190-214 with its original title: “On ‘Insolubilia’ and their Solution
by Symbolic Logic”. Quotation from p. 190.
28 « Les paradoxes. . . », p. 633, Essays. . . p.197.
29 « Les paradoxes. . . », p. 640-641, Essays. . . p.197.
30 « Les paradoxes. . . », p. 648-649, Essays. . . p.197. The French version
contains a translation error when compared to the manuscript published in the
Essays. The French term “phrase”, which appears twice, is a bad translation for
the English term “phrase”.
31 « La logique de l’inﬁni », p.402.
32 « La logique de l’inﬁni », p.414.
33 “Leśniewski’s Analysis of Russell’s Paradox”, Leśniewski’s Systems: Ontology and Mereology, Jan T. J. Srzednicki et als (eds), Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers,
The Hague, 1984 (1949-1950).
34 « Leśniewski’s analysis », p. 11.
35 For the sake of simplicity, I won’t use Polish notation.
36 Leśniewski S., “On Deﬁnitions in the So-called Theory of Deduction”, Stanislaw Leśniewski Collected Works, Vol II, Surma S. J. et als (eds.).
37 Most of these deﬁnition were introduced by Tarski who was the only doctoral student of Leśniewski. See “On the primitive term of logistic”, in Logic,
Semantics, and Metamathematics, J. Corcoran (ed.), Hackett Publishing, 1983,
pp. 1-23.
38 See J. Słupecki, « S. Leśniewski Calculus of Names”, in Studia Logica, III,
1955, reprint in Leśniewski’s Systems: Ontology and Mereology pp. 59-122
39 See Sobociński, pp.33-34.
40 Here, we should understand that ε is interpreted as ∈.
41 A1 says that for any multiplicity, there is a collective class of this multiplicity (comprehension). A2 says that two diﬀerent multiplicities give raise to two
diﬀerent collective classes (extensionality).
42 Sobociński, pp.30.
43 There is no fundamental diﬀerence berween deﬁnition and thesis for Leśniewski.
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This formula is a deﬁnition because the left member contains a new term.
44 We need a new symbol to escape confusion with set theoretic inclusion.
45 Our proposition is similar, in some aspects, to Peters Simons’, “On Understanding Leśniewski”, History and Philosophy of Logic, 3, 1982, pp. 165-191. (see
section 9 starting on p. 188). The main diﬀerences are ﬁrstly that, in Simons
approach, classes belong to a new category, “class name”. If x is a name and y is
a name of a class, x = y is neither true or false because it is not a wﬀ. Secondly,
“∈” is a primitive and ﬁnally, his approach seems to make no natural room for
mixed classes, i.e., classes having members of diﬀerent types like, for example,
{a, {a, b}}.
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